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COMMENT 
 
One Giant Heap for Mankind: The Need for 
National Legislation or Agency Action  
to Regulate Private Sector Contributions  
to Orbital Debris 
CHARLES MOTTIER 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Space exploration and utilization has been a steady and 
permanent industry ever since the launch of Sputnik I in 1957.1  
The development of space soon after that launch was based 
primarily on defense necessity and competition in connection with 
the Cold War.2  This competition led to the realization that space 
could have many uses other than simply a forum for semi-passive 
saber-rattling and defense systems experimentation.3  With 
increased use, the value of Earth’s orbit as a locus for 
communications and peaceful scientific experimentation has 
become readily apparent to developed countries.4  In the late 
1950s a total of twenty-one objects were successfully launched 
from Earth, but by the end of the Cold War, a space launch 
 
  1. Space Launch Totals by Decade, SPACE LAUNCH REPORT, 
http://www.spacelaunchreport.com/logdec.html#1990s (last updated Jan. 24, 
2013). 
 2. Rod Paschall, Coding and Decoding, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO 
AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY 147, 146-47 (John Whiteclay Chambers II ed., 
2000). 
 3. See, e.g., FREDRIC A. GODSHALL ET AL., NASA, EXAMPLES OF THE 
USEFULNESS OF SATELLITE DATA IN GENERAL ATMOSPHERIC CIRCULATION 
RESEARCH 6 (1969). 
 4. See Michael Griffin, The Real Reasons We Explore Space, AIR & SPACE 
MAGAZINE (July 2007), available at http://www.airspacemag.com/space-
exploration/Uncommentary.html?c=y&page=1. 
1
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occurred nearly twice weekly.5  This trend has continued into the 
twenty-first century with between fifty and ninety orbital 
launches per year, and the occupation of space shows no signs of 
diminishing.6 
Beginning in the mid-1980s, it became clear that private use 
of outer space would comprise an ever-growing component of 
space activities.7  Private development spurred by legislation 
aimed at allowing private use of space was slow at first, but is 
now a sector of significant economic importance.8  The National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (“NASA”) is committed to 
using private sector launch vehicles to the maximum extent 
practical.9  For example, a private sector launch vehicle delivered 
cargo to the International Space Station in March 2013.10  
Private usage of space is increasing, and its effects on the orbital 
environment ought to be given serious consideration. 
A direct effect of space usage in the past fifty years has been 
the accumulation of tons of space debris, commonly referred to as 
orbital debris or “space junk.”11  Space junk is composed of the 
relics of past exploratory missions and civilian satellite 
operations.12  Every time a rocket stage from a vehicle is depleted 
or a capsule separates, pieces of the vehicle break off of the 
assembly (by design) and are jettisoned into space with the 
intention that they will remain in orbit indeterminately or return 
to Earth via a calculated procedure to harmlessly burn up on 
 
 5. See Gunter Dirk Grebs, Chronology of Space Launches, GUNTER’S SPACE 
PAGE, http://space.skyrocket.de/directories/chronology.htm (last updated Dec. 27 
2013). 
 6. See id. 
 7. See Commercial Space Launch Act, Pub. L. No. 98-575, § 2, 98 Stat. 3055 
(1984) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.A. § 70101 et seq.). 
 8. See Office of Commercial Space Transportation: Recently 
Completed/Historical Launches, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., 
http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/launch_license/lice
nsed_launches/historical_launch/ (last modified Oct. 24, 2013, 1:24 PM). 
 9. 51 U.S.C. § 20301(b)(2) (2010). 
 10. See Dragon Delivers, SPACEX.COM (Mar. 3, 2013), 
http://www.spacex.com/news/2013/03/03/happy-berth-day. 
 11. See Orbital Objects, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, 
http://science.nationalgeographic.co.uk/science/space/solar-system/orbital/ (last 
visited Feb. 3, 2013). 
 12. Id. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss3/7
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reentry into the atmosphere.13  Needless to say, with procedures 
and machinery as complicated as those used in the space 
industry, these intentions are not always realized.14 
By current estimates there are that more than 21,000 pieces 
of orbital debris larger than ten centimeters in diameter 
surrounding the Earth, approximately 500,000 pieces between 
one and ten centimeters in diameter, and more than 100 million 
pieces smaller than one centimeter.15  Though Earth’s orbit is 
concededly a large place, this debris poses a very serious danger 
to the continued use of outer space.16  NASA’s greatest fear 
regarding sustained occupation of space is a collision between an 
occupied or operationally critical manmade object and a piece of 
space debris.17  Not only does this have the potential to cripple 
communications and even prevent the launch of future missions, 
it may threaten the lives of astronauts through destruction of 
their spacecraft.18 
The current body of international law on space debris is 
sparse, though still somewhat beneficial to the cause.  The only 
relevant international agreement regarding the phenomenon of 
space debris concerns the assignments of liability in the event of 
a celestial collision, or for objects falling from space and striking 
the Earth.19  There are no binding international documents 
concerning the control of space debris or the need to design 
objects launched into space to minimize debris.  Some countries 
have recognized the threat of orbital debris and have unilaterally 
implemented their own controls on prospective space activities 
 
 13. NASA, Orbital Debris Reentry, NASA ORBITAL DEBRIS PROGRAM OFFICE, 
http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/reentry/reentry.html (last updated Aug. 21, 
2009). 
 14. See Orbital Objects, supra note 16. 
 15. NASA, Orbital Debris Frequently Asked Questions, NASA ORBITAL DEBRIS 
PROGRAM OFFICE, http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/faqs.html#3 (last updated 
Mar. 2012). 
 16. See generally NASA, Another Debris Avoidance Maneuver for the ISS, 17 
ORBITAL DEBRIS Q. NEWS, no. 1, January 2013, at 3. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See Clara Moskowitz, Space Junk Problem is More Threatening Than 
Ever, Report Warns, SPACE (Sep. 1, 2011, 11:01 AM), 
http://www.space.com/12801-space-junk-threat-orbital-debris-report.html. 
 19. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space 
Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter “Space 
Liability Convention”]. 
3
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within their respective jurisdictions in order to slow the growth of 
the threat.20  Some national and multinational space agencies 
have even joined forces and created guideline statements 
concerning space debris.21 
One considerable drawback of these multilateral efforts to 
curb the debris problem is that these guideline statements are 
non-binding; potentially more problematic is the fact that the 
existing self-adopted rules made pursuant to those guidelines 
may be inapplicable to private sector launches.22  In order to 
protect current space installations and ensure that outer space 
may be utilized by posterity, it is essential that regulations be 
developed which limit the amount, type, and size of space debris 
that may be released in Earth’s orbit from private sector 
activities. 
In furtherance of this goal, this article will explain the 
dynamics of the space environment, examine current space law 
and its shortcomings both internationally and nationally, and 
present reasoned resolutions to the issue at hand including the 
use of petitions for action by United States government agencies 
and the encouragement of legislative action.  This article will also 
address certain positive and negative aspects of adopting debris-
regulating law.  Above all, the United States government and the 
American people should be made aware of the serious issues 
concerning the continued use of space by the private sector, and 
this article seeks to facilitate that conversation.  Through this 
awareness, the United States can address the current legal 
deficiencies and provide an example of the focus that should be 
given to space debris law. 
 
 20. NASA, Orbital Debris Mitigation, NASA ORBITAL DEBRIS PROGRAM 
OFFICE, http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/mitigate/mitigation.html (last updated 
Jan. 8, 2013); e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 25.114(d)(14) (2014) (requiring applicants for 
space station authorization to submit a statement on design and operation of 
said space station for the purpose of mitigating orbital debris). 
 21. See Inter-Agency Debris Coordination Committee, IADC, http://www.iadc-
online.org (last visited Mar. 27, 2013). 
 22. NASA & DEP’T OF DEF., U.S. GOVERNMENT ORBITAL DEBRIS MITIGATION 
STANDARD PRACTICES (1997), available at 
http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/library/USG_OD_Standard_Practices.pdf; 
NASA, supra note 24 (under the “Additional Information” header). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss3/7
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II.   BACKGROUND OF SCIENTIFIC PRINCIPLES 
UNIQUE TO OUTER SPACE 
In order to understand why space debris needs to be 
regulated at all, the physical aspects of outer space, which 
account for the danger of the debris, need to be understood.  The 
danger is a result of the combination of outer space’s lack of 
gravity, the speeds at which objects in space are travelling in 
orbit, and the lengthy presence of many space objects.23  It is 
clear that the most notable characteristic of the outer space 
environment is the lack of gravity.  Aside from the appeal of 
extraterrestrial perspective for monitoring and communications 
purposes, the absence of gravity is among the central appeals of 
exploring the near Earth environment.  Taking advantage of this 
feature, many experimental chemical processes and observations 
are conducted which are only possible in low gravity.24 
The characteristic effect of low gravity is that objects in 
motion tend to stay in that motion; this is the central tenet of 
Newton’s first law of motion, and the basis of orbital science.25  
As a result, objects that are released in space tend to continue on 
the trajectory of their release until acted upon by another force.26  
The predominant “other” force in this equation is the gravity of 
the Earth, which eventually corrals nearby objects and forces 
them to fall into the atmosphere.27  This process may take 
decades and, as a result, there are pieces of space junk floating in 
Earth’s orbit dating back to the genesis of spaceflight with no 
indication that they may soon collide with the atmosphere.28  
Consequently, objects in space have a semi-persistent presence 
 
 23. Lawrence D. Roberts, Addressing the Problem of Orbital Space Debris: 
Combining International Regulatory and Liability Regimes, 15 B.C. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 51, 55 (1992). 
 24. See e.g., Lawrence J. DeLucas et al., Protein Crystal Growth in Space, 
Past and Future, 237 J. OF CRYSTAL GROWTH 1646, 1646-1650 (2002); Andrei 
Markin et al., The Dynamics of Blood Biochemical Parameters in Cosmonauts 
During Long-Term Space Flights, 42 ACTA ASTRONAUTICA 247, 247-253 (1998). 
 25. STEVEN HOLZNER, PHYSICS FOR DUMMIES 64-73 (2006) (explaining Isaac 
Newton’s famous three laws of motion remedially). 
 26. Id. 
 27. See OLIVER MONTENBRUCK & EBERHARD GILL, SATELLITE ORBITS: MODELS, 
METHODS, AND APPLICATIONS 2-4 (2000). 
 28. Id.; NASA & DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 27. 
5
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and are thus liable to accumulate, rather than diminish, as space 
activity goes on. 
The other central characteristic of orbital space is the 
extreme speed at which objects are travelling.  In order to 
maintain an orbit around the Earth, as persistent space objects 
do, objects must be travelling at a tangential speed (with respect 
to the Earth) sufficient to negate the force of Earth’s pull.29  This 
speed varies depending on the distance of the orbit from Earth; 
an object’s orbital speed in near Earth orbit is generally in excess 
of 18,000 miles per hour, whereas an object in geostationary orbit 
may travel in excess of 67,000 miles per hour.30  Therefore, any 
collision of objects in space, even if only glancing, carries a high 
risk of complete catastrophe for the objects involved.  Some 
objects have been documented colliding in space in recent years, 
resulting in their complete destruction and the release of yet 
more debris.31 
Due to these unique aspects of space, there is a real danger of 
a chain-reaction event known as “Kessler Syndrome.”32  
Scientists fear that if a sufficient number of collisions occurs in 
orbit, a run-away reaction may prevent future use of space.33  
They theorize that when two space objects collide, that collision 
will result in more pieces of space debris than were involved in 
the original collision; those new fragments of debris would then 
cause more collisions and so forth indefinitely.34  The end result 
of such a reaction is the transformation of Earth’s orbital 
environment into a minefield that is no longer safe for manned or 
unmanned space activities; this would essentially trap mankind 
on the Earth, severely limit our ability to study our planet, and 
reduce our ability to communicate with each other.35  Outer space 
physics create an extremely hostile environment, and necessitate 
 
 29. MONTENBRUCK, supra note 32. 
 30. See Orbital Speed, FREEMARS, 
http://www.freemars.org/jeff/speed/index.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (showing 
orbital speed calculations and speed estimates for space objects at various 
altitudes). 
 31. See NASA, Satellite Collision Leaves Significant Debris Clouds, 13 
ORBITAL DEBRIS Q. NEWS, no. 2, April 2009, at 1. 
 32. KESSLER ET AL., supra note 2. 
 33. See id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 10. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss3/7
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regulation in order to maximize the safety of current missions 
and reduce the possibility of a reduction in spacefaring activities 
in the future. 
III.   RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 
The current body of space law is largely implemented by 
individual nations through their space agencies.36  Apart from 
such independent, domestically-centered regulations, 
international agreements on the use of space are few in number 
and lacking in substance.  The first substantial contribution to 
international space law was the “Outer Space Treaty”37 created in 
1967 to address the growing concerns over mankind’s increasing, 
multilateral use of outer space.38  This is the most influential 
international agreement concerning space law, and among the 
most widely ratified.39 
Chief among the guiding principles of the Outer Space Treaty 
are that space exploration be for the “benefit of all mankind” and 
that international laws should govern activities in outer space.40  
The Outer Space Treaty addresses liability assignment for space 
activities by making clear that the nation responsible for the 
launch retains ownership of and responsibility for the object.41  
Consequently, any resulting conflict arising on account of the 
activities of that object is attributable to the nation that launched 
it.42  The treaty also states that party nations are to convene and 
consult with one another in the event that one nation’s space 
activities may endanger those of another nation or the peaceful 
use of outer space as a whole.43  With the addition of more space 
debris with every launch, it is now apparent that any launch has 
the potential to endanger the space activities of another 
spacefaring nation; while the immediate likelihood of such a 
 
 36. See IADC, supra note 25. 
 37. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 
27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter “Outer Space Treaty”]. 
 38. Id. pmbl. 
 39. See id. (signatories number over one hundred nations). 
 40. Id. art. I, III., supra note 42. 
 41. Id. art. VII. 
 42. Id. art. VI-VIII. 
 43. Outer Space Treaty at art. IX. 
7
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collision is slim, there is recognition of the growing danger.44  It 
logically follows that nations participating in the Outer Space 
Treaty are compelled to resolve the issue of how to minimize the 
likelihood of an orbital collision and the theorized run-away chain 
reaction.45 
In 1972, and in furtherance of the controlled exploration of 
outer space, the United Nations General Assembly presented a 
treaty colloquially called the “Space Liability Convention.”46  
Article III of this convention provided that when two objects 
collided, whatever party is at fault is liable for damages resulting 
from the collision.47  The most significant limitation of this treaty 
is that it would only apply to situations where fault could be 
determined.  Because many pieces of space debris are no larger 
than a bolt or screw (and in most cases much smaller) it is 
relatively impossible to assign liability and causation.48  To 
further complicate  the assignment of liability, much debris is not 
catalogued, the launching state is often unsure whether it has 
released debris, debris is difficult to track, and existing debris 
may be decades old.49  Thus, the problem of liability is complex.  
At least for liability, there are situations where no redress is 
feasible due to one or more of these complications; in such 
situations, a precautionary/remedial approach to debris control is 
warranted.50 
In order to fulfill the limited purposes of the Space Liability 
Convention, a proper registry of space activities was necessary.  
 
 44. See.supra, Part II. 
 45. See generally Outer Space Treaty (Although this problem is not 
specifically addressed in the Outer Space Treaty, it is a logical outgrowth of the 
treaty’s application that the problem be confronted). 
 46. See generally Space Liability Convention, supra note 23. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See supra, Part II. 
 49. Debris is tracked through observation efforts on the ground, while 
agencies like NASA are conscious that their craft may release a certain amount 
of debris, total omniscience as to what piece came from which craft when is 
infeasible to determine.  See NASA, supra note 19. 
 50. Cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). (The global issue of carbon 
dioxide contributions resulting in climate change was recognized; while it was 
generally known from where much of the gas came, the effects of the releases 
had not yet been realized and liability was not assigned. Knowledge of the 
potential and inevitable effects of releasing carbon dioxide justified imposing 
rules for limitation on that release). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss3/7
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In 1974, the United Nations opened a treaty for signature to 
address this concern, the Convention on Registration of Launched 
Objects into Outer Space (Registration Convention).51  The treaty 
required that any “space object” or its component parts that are 
intended to travel into outer space be registered with the 
Secretary General of the United Nations.52  However, the 
convention failed to take into account the incidental expulsion of 
objects into space, a significant contributing factor to the problem 
of orbital debris.53  While it is clear that a habitation capsule or 
the booster stage of a rocket would qualify as a “space object,” it is 
impractical or impossible to register a loose rivet or an insulation 
foam shard incidental to the separation of vehicles, especially if 
the releases are unknown.  While the Registration Convention 
does provide a list of possible sources of space debris, it has no 
provisions that explicitly or implicitly limit the release of small 
and incidental debris objects into orbit. 
The foregoing treaties are low on substantive solutions for 
the present problem, mainly because they are non-self-executing, 
were created with domestic implementation in mind, and do not 
address all of the complexities of spacefaring activities.  
Nonetheless, these treaties have been ratified by all major 
participants in outer space utilization.54  While they have 
addressed some of the concerns related to orbital debris, the 
domestic implementation of the agreements has resulted in 
incomplete regulation of orbital debris, especially in the United 
States. 
IV.   UNITED STATES’ REGULATION OF ORBITAL 
DEBRIS 
Outer space is an international environment that requires 
multilateral cooperation in order to secure its utility and 
 
 51. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Nov. 
12, 1974, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter “Registration 
Convention”]. 
 52. Id. art. I, II. 
 53. U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 18 (1990). 
 54. See generally Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal 
Subcomm, Rep. on its 52nd Sess., Apr. 8-Apr. 19, 2013, U.N. Doc. 
A/AC.105/C.2/2013/CRP.5 (Mar. 28, 2013) available at 
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/pdf/limited/c2/AC105_C2_2013_CRP05E.pdf. 
9
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preservation.  This can only be achieved by improving 
implementation of international agreements at the national 
level.55  While there is no barrier to nations creating 
supplementary bilateral or multilateral treaties to implement 
major international agreements, it is more practical for a nation 
to address the particulars of its own spacefaring activities and 
create domestically binding regulations, as the United States has.  
In addition to United Nations treaties, domestic regulations may 
be inspired by alternative international guidance and 
cooperation.  Several nations have taken the initiative, through 
their respective space agencies, to promulgate cooperative non-
binding guidelines addressing mitigation of space debris.56 
The Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee 
(“IADC”) worked with several space agencies to create the most 
comprehensive and influential guidelines on the subject.57  The 
guidelines’ most pertinent provisions require a participating 
agency to limit space debris release during normal operations to 
the extent feasible, to dispose of potential orbital debris after the 
conclusion of a mission, and to plan missions with the express 
purpose of minimizing the possibility of orbital collisions.58  Each 
space agency is therefore responsible for implementing these 
practices.  Recognizing the urgency of the space debris problem, 
President Barack Obama issued a statement revising United 
States space policy with specific emphasis on the preservation of 
the orbital environment in keeping with the spirit of the IADC 
guidelines as well as previous international agreements.59  
Congress has likewise taken initiative and incorporated the 
principles of the IADC guidelines and the new executive policy 
 
 55. See generally Space Liability Convention supra note 23, see also Outer 
Space Treaty, supra note 41. 
 56. IADC, supra note 25 (showing that international guidelines for the 
mitigation of space debris have been agreed upon by space agencies from: Italy, 
France, China, Canada, Germany, the European Union, India, Japan, the 
United States, Russia, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom); see IADC, IADC 
SPACE DEBRIS MITIGATION GUIDELINES (Sept. 2007), available at http://www.iadc-
online.org/index.cgi?item=docs_pub. 
 57. IADC, SPACE DEBRIS MITIGATION GUIDELINES (Sept. 2007), available at 
http://www.iadc-online.org/index.cgi?item=docs_pub. 
 58. Id. § 5. 
 59. NATIONAL SPACE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, (June 28, 
2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/national_space_policy_6-28-10.pdf. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss3/7
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into its latest authorizing statute for NASA in 2010, and NASA 
has in turn incorporated the guidelines into its regulations for the 
governance of its space activities.60 
Unfortunately, existing United States law regarding space 
debris is not comprehensive with respect to all United States 
space activities.  While the United States has taken appreciable 
steps toward limiting the country’s contribution to the orbital 
debris problem, the guidelines and agency regulations apply 
primarily to government activities and are silent, inapplicable, or 
avoidable as to the space activities of the private sector.  
Consequently, there is no legally binding regulation on the 
private sector forcing it to reduce its release of certain debris into 
orbit. 
As it stands, the private sector is poised to expand its current 
operations in Earth’s orbit and eventually assume many 
historically governmental aspects of space activity.61  NASA has 
planned for this expansion to a limited extent and has committed 
to utilizing private sector launch vehicles and technology to the 
extent practical.62  NASA, however, is not the governing agency 
that licenses and regulates the launch of private sector space 
objects; that duty falls on the Department of Transportation 
through the Federal Aviation Administration, specifically the 
Office of Commercial Space Transportation (“AST”).63  AST was 
established to regulate and promote commercial space 
transportation, recommend regulatory changes to commercial 
space transportation laws, and bolster the United States’ space 
 
 60. See 51 U.S.C. §§ 10101-71302 (2012); 14 C.F.R. §§ 1200-1299 (2013); 
NASA, NASA TECHNICAL STANDARD 8719.14A: PROCESS FOR LIMITING ORBITAL 
DEBRIS (2012), available at 
https://standards.nasa.gov/documents/detail/3315680. 
 61. See Adam Mann, The Year’s Most Audacious Private Space Plans, 
WIRED.COM (Dec. 27, 2012, 6:30AM), 
http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2012/12/audacious-space-companies-2012/; 
see also Emi Kolawole, NASA Awards Multi-Million Dollar Contracts to Boeing 
SpaceX and Sierra Nevada for Human Spaceflight, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/innovations/post/nasa-awards-
multimillion-dollar-contracts-to-boeing-spacex-and-sierra-nevada-for-human-
spaceflight/2012/08/03/a40938c0-dd89-11e1-af1d-753c613ff6d8_blog.html. 
 62. 51 U.S.C. § 20301(b)(2) (2012). 
 63. FAA, OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION: ABOUT THE OFFICE, 
http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/about/ (last visited 
Mar. 27, 2013). 
11
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transportation infrastructure.64  Although operating in the same 
field as NASA, AST differs significantly in that it regulates 
private entities.  This difference may explain the disparity in 
regulations between private and government projects. 
Entry into outer space by commercial entities is not a new 
phenomenon; it was anticipated and lauded by President Reagan 
and the 98th Congress.65  The Commercial Space Launch Act, 
enacted in 1984, not only created AST and the licensing 
procedures and requirements for private sector space activities, 
but it also included a purposive provision that suggested a major 
difference between the private and public sector space industries: 
the promotion of economic growth.66  While NASA is a participant 
in the economic exploitation of space,67 private space companies 
are able to more easily profit from space due to their efficiency.68  
It is reasonable to think that the Congress, in enacting the 
Commercial Space Launch Act, was more interested in spurring 
the national economy and broadening American companies’ 
extraterrestrial participation than protecting space orbits from 
debris incidental to private sector launches.69  Forcing a private 
sector business to implement controls on debris would be costly, 
and in an industry with such a high monetary barrier70 to entry 
as space exploration, every penny counts.  However, the 
Commercial Space Launch Act was passed with the 1980’s 
private sector environment in mind – that is, it was concerned 
with growing the private space industry.  Now that the industry 
has developed, the Commercial Space Launch Act is outdated. 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. Commercial Space Launch Act, Pub. L. No. 98-575, 98 Stat. 3055 (1984). 
 66. Id. § 3(1). 
 67. Stephen J. Dubner, Is Space Exploration Worth the Cost? A Freakonomics 
Quorum, FREAKONOMICS.COM (Jan. 11, 2008), 
http://www.freakonomics.com/2008/01/11/is-space-exploration-worth-the-cost-a-
freakonomics-quorum/ (quoting G. Scott Hubbard, former director of the NASA 
Ames Research Center, “It is true that, for every dollar we spend on the space 
program, the U.S. economy receives about $8 of economic benefit.”). 
 68. Phoenix McLaughlin, SpaceX Spends 320 Times Less on Building the 
Dragon Than NASA Does on the Orion, POLICYMIC (July 2012), 
http://www.policymic.com/articles/11354/spacex-spends-320-times-less-on-
building-the-dragon-than-nasa-does-on-the-orion. 
 69. S. REP. NO. 98-656 at *6 (1984). 
 70. See Why the US Can Beat China: The Facts About SpaceX Costs, 
SPACEREF (May 4, 2011), http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewpr.html?pid=33457. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss3/7
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AST’s licensing power is not entirely toothless regarding 
regulation of orbital debris.  The Secretary of Transportation has 
the authority to impose restrictions, such as debris regulation, on 
a license applicant upon issuance of the license.71  This restrictive 
power has yet to be exercised by AST, but AST’s treatment of the 
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) sheds light on how 
these restrictions may be imposed.72 
As it currently stands, AST does not require consideration of 
the effects of debris on much of the orbital environment in order 
to comply with NEPA.73  When preparing an application for 
licensing under the Commercial Space Launch Act, an applicant 
is encouraged to submit, along with the required application 
information, sufficient information concerning the environmental 
effects of the project such that the Secretary of Transportation 
can determine whether an Environmental Impact Statement is 
necessary in order to comply with NEPA.74  The guidance 
document for this process requires a discussion of the 
atmospheric impact of orbital debris.75  Any atmospheric impact 
to be considered by AST in an environmental assessment is 
limited to those impacts felt in the ionosphere, which has a 
maximum ceiling of roughly 960 kilometers.76  Distinctly absent 
from the guidance document is any requirement for consideration 
of orbital debris77  above 960 kilometers, a region which contains 
hundreds of satellites.78  It appears that the Council on 
 
 71. 51 U.S.C. § 50905(b)(2) (2012). 
 72. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370h (2012). 
 73. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i) (2012); 40 C.F.R. § 1501.3 (2013); 14 C.F.R. § 
413.7 (2013); see AST, GUIDELINES FOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE NATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT AND RELATED ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW STATUTES FOR 
THE LICENSING OF COMMERCIAL LAUNCHES AND LAUNCH SITES (2001), available at 
http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/licenses_permits/m
edia/epa5dks.pdf [hereinafter “AST NEPA GUIDELINES”]. 
 74. Id. 
 75. AST NEPA Guidelines, at App.. D (VII)(2). 
 76. AST NEPA Guidelines at 21; Rani C. Gran & Laura Layton, Space Has 
Never Been Closer: NASA Instruments Document Contraction of the Boundary 
between the Earth’s Ionosphere and Space, NASA, 
http://www.nasa.gov/topics/earth/features/outer_atmosphere.html (last visited 
Feb. 25, 2014). 
 77. For the purposes of succinctness, “orbital debris” as referenced in this 
article shall refer to that debris which is beyond the ionosphere. 
 78. List of Satellites in Geostationary Orbit, SATELLITE SIGNALS, 
http://www.satsig.net/sslist.htm (last updated Feb. 21, 2014). 
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Environmental Quality (“CEQ”), the administrator of NEPA, and 
the AST have never considered the orbital surroundings of Earth 
beyond the ionosphere to be subject to NEPA.79 
Additionally, NEPA’s application to the area beyond the 
ionosphere is subject to two limitations.  First, NEPA is only 
applicable to major federal actions which have the potential to 
significantly affect the “human environment.”80  Second, NEPA’s 
extraterritorial application must be considered.  This second issue 
was presented under similar factual circumstances in 
Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey, concerning 
extraterritorial application of NEPA in the “sovereignless” 
territory of Antarctica.81  Among other considerations, the court 
held that when applying NEPA where all major decisions are 
made in United States territory and where conflict with another 
sovereign’s law is not present, the presumption against 
extraterritoriality of a statute is inapplicable.82  Concerning 
licensing private space launches, all licensing decisions are made 
domestically, and there is likewise no definite sovereign over the 
subject territory of outer space.  It is therefore reasonable to 
conclude that upon a determination that orbital debris 
significantly affects the “human environment,” NEPA’s 
Environmental Impact Statement requirements should apply. 
Even if orbital debris were to be considered in an 
Environmental Impact Statement pursuant to NEPA and an AST 
licensing procedure, there would still be no guarantee of 
substantive environmental protection from NEPA.  NEPA is 
simply a procedural statute and does not force an agency to 
impose any measure of environmental protection so long as there 
 
 79. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i) (There is no explicit or implicit intention in 
the statute for orbital space beyond the ionosphere to be considered an 
“environment,” but there is no preclusion of the Council on Environmental 
Quality on making that interpretation.  Thus far there has been no action taken 
at any level in furtherance of making that interpretation, suggesting that it 
would be a novel legal issue to the agency.). 
 80. 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(c) (2012).  A discussion of the unregulated zone beyond 
the ionosphere affecting the “human environment” appears below in Part V. 
 81. See Envt’l Def. Fund. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
 82. Id. 
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has been an adequate identification and evaluation of the 
environmental impact of the action.83 
Environmental protection against orbital debris currently 
exercised by AST has the potential to be inapplicable under a new 
administration.  Since AST, an Executive agency under the 
Department of Transportation, adheres to President Obama’s 
National Space Policy of the United States of America,84 it must 
create its own orbital debris reduction procedures as NASA did.85  
However, this adherence is not required by the current version of 
the Commercial Space Launch Act, only by Executive policy.86  If 
Executive policy were to change, by a change of the 
administration for example, the Secretary of Transportation 
could, under the Commercial Space Launch Act, waive any 
requirement pursuant to issuance of a license, even the need for a 
license itself, if he finds that such a waiver is in the public 
interest and will not jeopardize public health or safety, safety of 
property, and national security and foreign policy interests, 
unless a human is on board.87  Consequently, President Obama’s 
National Space Policy document does not offer the kind of 
permanent protection which would survive a change in 
administration. 
Whether the Secretary would consider the addition of debris 
from a launch a danger is unclear.  While the policy statement by 
the President recognizes the need to limit orbital debris for the 
sustainable use of the orbital environment, neither the President 
nor any relevant Executive agency has gone so far as to qualify 
any single, specific addition of debris as dangerous.88  This 
interpretation is consistent with a preference for economic 
 
 83. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 
435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978); see also Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. 
Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980). 
 84. WHITE HOUSE, NAT’L SPACE POLICY OF THE U.S. (June 28, 2010), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/national_space_policy_6-28-10.pdf. 
 85. See generally FAA, Office of Commercial Space Transportation: 
Legislation and Policies, THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 
http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/legislation_policies/ 
(last modified Sept. 10, 2013). 
 86. 51 U.S.C. § 50905(b)(3) (2011). 
 87. Id. 
 88. See generally NAT’L SPACE POLICY , supra note 88. 
15
  
872 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  31 
development of space, reminiscent of the Reagan era, as opposed 
to a concern for the safety of the space environment. 
It may also be argued that existing United States space law 
policies would adequately regulate private sector orbital debris.  
However, this argument is potentially flawed.  United States 
governmental agencies, such as NASA and the Department of 
Transportation, rely heavily on the “U.S. Government Orbital 
Debris Mitigation Standard Practices,” a document meant to 
guide agencies in creating regulations which restrict orbital 
debris89  This document, developed by NASA and adopted by all 
United States government agencies by 2001, included meaningful 
purposive and practical mandates for the limitation and 
reduction of debris in Earth orbit.90  Although the document itself 
purports to apply to “all operational orbit regimes” these 
guidelines have questionable application to private sector space 
activities.91  The document is silent on which entities are to be 
regulated, and an external governmental description of the 
policy’s applicability speaks only of “government operated or 
procured space systems.”92 Whether issuance of a license 
amounts to government operation or procurement of a private 
sector space system is unclear.  Thus, the current United States 
Standard Practices document is potentially inapplicable to the 
private sector. 
Even assuming that the Standard Practices document is 
applicable to the private sector, there is a glaring fault which has 
the potential to allow the release of copious amounts of orbital 
debris.  The document does specify that spacecraft should be 
designed to minimize the release of debris; however, debris under 
five millimeters in any dimension is allowed to be jettisoned with 
no restriction, and debris larger than five millimeters may be 
jettisoned pending evaluation of cost effectiveness and mission 
requirements.93  The second situation gives no attention to the 
environmental considerations attendant to release of orbital 
 
 89. See generally NASA & DEP’T OF DEF., U.S. GOV’T ORBITAL DEBRIS 
MITIGATION STANDARD PRACTICES (1997),  
http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/library/USG_OD_Standard_Practices.pdf. 
 90. See id.; NASA, supra note 24 (under the “Additional Information” 
header). 
 91. See ORBITAL DEBRIS MITIGATION STANDARD PRACTICES, supra note 93. 
 92. Id. 
 93. ORBITAL DEBRIS MITIGATION STANDARD PRACTICES, supra note 93. 
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debris and no guidance on what is cost effective or required by a 
mission.  The Standard Practices document provides little 
assurance that orbital debris is effectively minimized. 
To summarize, the regulatory body of law on private sector 
additions of orbital debris falls short.  International treaties bind 
countries to use space for peaceful purposes and to allow for space 
exploitation for the benefit of the human race; domestic space 
agencies have followed the essence of these treaties, but fall short 
of effective regulation of the private sector.94  The IADC provided 
guidelines to government agencies which, upon their adoption, 
became binding on the agencies, but not necessarily private space 
operations.95  Congress, through its failure to address the private 
sector space industry in the latest NASA authorization statute 
and its effective exemption of private companies from 
environmental considerations in the Commercial Space Launch 
Act, has left the private sector, perhaps intentionally, 
environmentally unregulated.96  The Secretary of Transportation 
may impose restrictions, such as an environmental restriction 
upon the grant of a license, but there is no requirement that he do 
so; even if there were, the Secretary may waive that 
requirement.97  As a consequence, the only environmental 
protections against private sector orbital debris come from an 
Executive policy which is subject to change following a change in 
administration.98  AST also fails to consider the effects of orbital 
debris released beyond the ionosphere when reviewing a license 
applicant’s environmental assessment.99  Additionally, NEPA 
fails to provide any substantive protection to the orbital 
environment as it is only a procedural statute. 100  If applicable, 
perhaps the most protective is the U.S. Government Orbital 
Debris Mitigation Standard Practices, which allows for 
widespread addition of debris below a certain size and also 
addition of larger debris pending evaluation of non-environmental 
 
 94. See supra, Part III. 
 95. See supra, Part IV. 
 96. 51 U.S.C. §§ 10101-71302 (2010). 
 97. 51 U.S.C. § 50905(b)(2)-(3) (2011). 
 98. AST NEPA Guidelines at Appx. D (VII)(2)(a)(5). 
 99. AST NEPA Guidelines at 21. 
 100. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 4332; see also supra, Part IV. 
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factors.101  At best, regulation of orbital debris from private sector 
space launches depends on whether the Secretary sees fit to 
impose protective requirements; at worst, there is essentially no 
effective regulation of orbital debris for private sector space 
activities. 
Interestingly, we find another approach to orbital debris 
mitigation in United States law, one that is not based on private 
or public identity, but on use.  This approach is implemented by 
the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”), which 
requires that any proposed communications satellite must 
include in its license application a plan for reduction of debris 
including disposal of the satellite after expiration of its useful 
life.102  Nevertheless, the regulation falls short in that it only 
applies to communications satellites.103  Given the limited scope 
of the FCC regulatory sphere, the regulation does not provide a 
proper platform upon which to base the industry-wide protection 
required to solve the problem of orbital debris. 
V.   REVISING THE CURRENT BODY OF UNITED 
STATES SPACE LAW 
There are several routes that a revision of the current body of 
United States space law may take that would allow greater 
controls on the private sector’s contribution to orbital debris.  In 
order to mitigate debris not subject to IADC-derivative 
regulation, there must be an assurance that agencies, such as 
AST, will create legally binding rules on orbital debris for private 
companies, or at the very least ensure that procedural provisions 
such as NEPA apply to private activities in the region beyond the 
ionosphere. 
First, the regulation of private space debris should be based 
on either a comprehensive agency rule or federal statute with 
clear standards controlling the discretion of the Secretary of 
Transportation to either impose certain restrictions or waive 
them.  Of those two choices, an agency rule is the more practical 
approach.  If  upon its own volition, the agency does not 
undertake rulemaking, then members of the public might petition 
 
 101. ORBITAL DEBRIS MITIGATION STANDARD PRACTICES, supra note 93. 
 102. See e.g. 47 C.F.R. § 5.64 (2012). 
 103. Id. 
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for a rule.  The Commercial Space Launch Act does not include a 
provision for the public to petition for the issuance of a rule; 
however, the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), which 
applicable to administrative procedures, does allow for petition by 
interested persons.104  Who qualifies as an interested party in 
such situations can be complicated.  A member of the regulated 
community would certainly meet the legal requirements, 
although such an entity might be unlikely to seek regulation.  
Petitions might more likely come from cell phone users or 
satellite television users, who receive benefits from an 
uncluttered space environment, particularly the uninterrupted 
use of satellites and the benefits of space innovations. Whether 
they would qualify as interested parties under the APA would 
depend on the specific facts of the case. 
Alternatively, Congress might amend the Commercial Space 
Launch Act to more stringently regulate private space debris and 
to require that environmental impact analyses include evaluation 
of space debris generated by the activity.  Concerning 
environmental assessment, there is currently nothing in NEPA, 
the Commercial Space Launch Act, Council on Environmental 
Quality regulations, or Department of Transportation regulations 
classifying space beyond the ionosphere as a “human 
environment” that would require an environmental impact 
assessment on a proposed federal action, such as the grant of a 
license.  Despite this lack of such a classification, the region 
beyond the ionosphere may still be subject to an environmental 
impact assessment under NEPA due to the fact that it does 
significantly affect the “human environment” which lies beneath 
it.105 
Low Earth orbit can reasonably be interpreted as a “human 
environment” under NEPA based on the broad scope of the term 
“environment.”  The provision in NEPA concerning “major 
Federal actions affecting the quality of the human environment” 
is meant to be broadly interpreted and strictly imposed.106  For 
example, “‘[e]nvironment’ means something more than rocks, 
 
 104. 51 U.S.C. §§ 50901-50923 (2011); 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2012). 
 105. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (c) (2012). 
 106. Jones v. U.S. Dep’t of Housing and Urban Dev., 390 F. Supp. 579, 591 
(E.D. La. 1974) (referencing Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic 
Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971)). 
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trees, and streams, or the amount of air pollution[;] [i]t 
encompasses all the factors that affect the quality of life: 
crowding, squalor, and crime are obviously adverse 
environmental factors.”107  This interpretation suggests that 
when a major United States federal action could have significant 
impact on an area with a human presence, NEPA may be 
applicable.108  It then follows that low Earth orbit can be 
considered a “human environment” given that it has had and 
continues to have a human presence.109  Orbital debris beyond 
the ionosphere does inevitably fall from its high altitude to the 
occupied region below it.  The low Earth orbit “human 
environment” is thus clearly affected by debris released in regions 
beyond the ionosphere.  Consequently, NEPA’s environmental 
impact analysis should consider debris releases beyond the 
ionosphere. 
Space beyond the ionosphere may be interpreted as a NEPA-
protected environment in its own right in that its continued use 
“stimulate[s] the health and welfare of man . . . .”110  The benefits 
to mankind in keeping space exploration uninhibited are 
innumerable.  As previously mentioned, there are medical 
breakthroughs and scientific discoveries that only could have 
been made in orbit.111  Likewise, the contribution to mankind’s 
understanding of the Earth has resulted in substantial benefit 
and terrestrial technological advancement.112  The continued 
exploration of space beyond the ionosphere can only serve to 
benefit the health and welfare of mankind. 
Upon further examination of NEPA’s purposive language, 
space beyond the ionosphere can reasonably be interpreted as an 
environment in the sense that it may produce resources 
important to the United States.  One of NEPA’s purposes is to 
 
 107. Jones, 390 F. Supp. at 591 (alteration in original). 
 108. See id. 
 109. See International Space Station, NASA, 
http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/expeditions/index.html (last visited 
Apr. 16, 2013) (showing a cumulative crew time on the International Space 
Station alone in excess of 4,500 days). 
 110. See 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2012).  
 111. DELUCAS ET AL., supra note 28, at 1647; MARKIN ET AL., supra note 28, at 
247. 
 112. See Benefits of Space Exploration, NASA HEADQUARTERS LIBRARY (Nov. 
2010), http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/hqlibrary/pathfinders/spinoff.htm. 
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“enrich the understanding of . . . natural resources important to 
the Nation.”113  A planned purpose of future space missions is 
harvesting natural resources present in asteroids and other small 
celestial bodies.114 The harvest and exploitation of celestial 
compounds can only exist when access to such bodies is 
unimpeded by the dangers of a Kessler-type debris cloud.  Since 
this potential boon of natural resources remains largely 
untouched or undiscovered, it would be pertinent for NEPA to 
encompass activities in regions that might limit mankind’s ability 
to formulate an understanding of and explore those resources. 
The region beyond the ionosphere has thus far not been 
considered in AST’s licensing procedures despite the preceding 
arguments that NEPA ought to apply.  AST should starting 
taking a hard look at significant environmental impacts that 
result from its licensing.  To include significant impacts in space 
as “environmental” impacts, revisions could be made to NEPA or 
regulations that interpret NEPA.  Revision of NEPA, to require 
environmental impact analysis for debris released beyond the 
ionosphere, is neither necessary nor wise, since lobbying to 
amend a statute concerning environmental protection may open 
that statute to less environmentally friendly modifications.  
Amendment of the Council of Environmental Quality’s NEPA 
regulations would be adequate to make orbital debris releases 
beyond the ionosphere a consideration in environmental impact 
analyses.  Alternatively, petition could be made for an AST 
regulation requiring such consideration in environmental 
assessments, or a petition could be made to directly require 
private license applicants to provide protections more stringent 
than those in the U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation 
Standard Practices. 
Interpreting space beyond the ionosphere as affecting the 
human-occupied region beneath it, or as an environment in its 
 
 113. 42 U.S.C. § 4321. 
 114. Cecilia Jamasmie, Asteroid Mining to Dominate the Industry: Experts, 
MINING.COM (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.mining.com/asteroid-mining-to-
dominate-the-industry-experts-69016/; Staff Writers, Stott Space Aims to Mine 
Asteroids this Decade, SPACEDAILY.COM (Mar. 1, 2013), 
http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Stott_Space_Aims_to_Mine_Asteroids_this_D
ecade_999.html; Asteroid Mining Plans Announced, HAZARDEX (Mar. 12, 2013), 
http://www.hazardexonthenet.net/article/56880/Asteroid-mining-plans-
announced.aspx. 
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own right, would allow for additional procedures and potential 
protections.  Through the inclusion of the preceding concepts in 
American space regulation, the United States can set an example 
for intolerance of space debris which may be imitated worldwide 
to a beneficial effect. 
VI.   POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF NATIONAL DEBRIS 
REGULATION ON THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
The private sector would understandably resist the 
imposition of a rule regulating the release of orbital debris beyond 
the ionosphere and even the consideration of such orbital debris 
in an environmental impact analysis. Assuming that some control 
does in fact occur through a scenario explored by this article, the 
impact on private launches would be largely predictable. 
With a focus on debris reduction, companies would be 
compelled to invest in new research, engineering, and launch 
strategies in order to be granted a license to operate.  While this 
would be a significant economic hurdle for companies wishing to 
enter the market, the greatest mitigation of future dangers could 
be better achieved at the infancy stages of private sector 
participation.  As it stands, there are only seven private 
companies licensed to launch spacecraft.115  Proactively 
addressing this problem could drastically reduce economic impact 
on the private sector if implemented now, rather than when there 
are substantially more licensees. 
Private space companies are not struggling either.  Space is a 
lucrative business and, as private companies contribute more to 
the development of space technologies, the industry as a whole is 
ripe to expand and reduce its relative costs.116  Arguably, such 
expansion was the main impetus in passing the Commercial 
Space Launch Act in the first place.  It is apparent with the 
growth of the private sector that economic considerations can no 
longer be the only source of regulatory inspiration; a 
 
 115. Launch Data and Information: Active Licenses, FED.AVIATION ADMIN., 
http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/launch_license/acti
ve_licenses/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2013). 
 116. See Keep on Truckin’: A Private Company Heads for the International 
Space Station, ECONOMIST (May 5, 2012), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21554170; see, e.g., SPACEREF, supra note 74. 
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consideration on the environmental impacts on outer space is also 
warranted. 
VII.   CONCLUSION 
The use of outer space for human exploration and 
exploitation has been ongoing and expanding for more than half a 
century.117  At first there was only government participation in 
space use,118 and international agreements provided an outline of 
uses and purposes for which space ought to be utilized.119  
Subsequent adoption of international agreements provided the 
guidance necessary to preserve space for the benefit of all 
mankind.120  Unfortunately, those provisions were shortsighted 
or intentionally not all-inclusive. 
At least in the case of the United States, regulation of space 
debris beyond the ionosphere may currently be inapplicable to 
private sector space participants.121  Private sector space 
activities are governed by a separate set of rules than public 
sector space activities and administered by a different agency 
altogether, making NASA’s policy statements and guidelines 
concerning space debris inapplicable.122  The Secretary of 
Transportation, the person in charge of commercial space access, 
is not bound to require a mitigation of orbital debris in his 
consideration of private space launch licensing applications 
beyond what is required in the U.S. Government Orbital Debris 
Mitigation Guidelines.123  These guidelines provide inadequate 
protection because they do not concern materials below five 
millimeters, and for materials above that threshold, release may 
be allowed without an environmental consideration.124  As a 
result, the private space industry has the potential to pollute the 
 
 117. See Gunter Dirk Grebs, Chronology of Space Launches, GUNTER’S SPACE 
PAGE, http://space.skyrocket.de/directories/chronology.htm (last updated Dec. 9, 
2012). 
 118. See id. 
 119. See generally Outer Space Treaty, supra note 41, Space Liability 
Convention, supra note 23, Registration Convention, supra note 55. 
 120. See generally 51 U.S.C. §§10101-71302 (2012). 
 121. See id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. AST NEPA Guidelines, supra note 79 app.D(VII)(2)(a)(5); ORBITAL DEBRIS 
MITIGATION STANDARD PRACTICES, supra note 93. 
 124. ORBITAL DEBRIS MITIGATION STANDARD PRACTICES, supra note 93. 
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upper orbital environment of Earth with impunity unless the 
Secretary specifically assigns additional restrictions on the 
license.  The Secretary also has the power to waive any 
restriction on a license given a finding of public benefit and the 
lack of a finding of danger.125  Thus far, there is no indication 
that the addition of orbital debris has been regarded as a danger 
which might discourage the Secretary from granting a waiver. 
Under current industry and agency practice, addition of 
orbital debris above the ionosphere is not considered in a NEPA-
required environmental impact analysis.126  NEPA arguably 
should be applicable to this region because the addition of debris 
in orbit significantly affects the “human environment.”127  
Alternatively, the region beyond the ionosphere can be 
interpreted as an environment subject to NEPA in its own right, 
because it would “stimulate[] the health and welfare of man,” and 
“enrich the understanding of . . . natural resources important to 
the Nation.”128  A revision of agency regulations is recommended 
to reinforce NEPA’s application to the release of debris beyond 
the ionosphere. 
It was Congress’ intention when it passed the Commercial 
Space Launch Act to reduce as much as possible the barriers to 
entry into such an expensive industry.129  The motivations 
present for the original legislation are now outdated given the 
fact that private space companies are having little trouble 
gaining footholds in the space industry and profiting.130  The lack 
of regulation on orbital debris has the potential to render orbit 
around Earth inaccessible, unusable, reduce mankind’s ability to 
 
 125. 51 U.S.C. § 50905(b)(3) (2012). 
 126. See e.g. FAA, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR PEGASUS LAUNCHES AT 
U.S. ARMY KWAJAELIN ATOLL RONALD REAGAN BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE TEST 
SITE. (2009) available at 
http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/media/2009%20EA
%20for%20Pegasus%20LLO%20Renewal%20USAKA.pdf. 
 127. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (2012). 
 128. 42 U.S.C. § 4321(2012). 
 129. See Commercial Space Launch Act, Pub. L. No. 98-575, 98 Stat. 3055 
(1984) (current version at 51 U.S.C. § 50901 (West 2010)). 
 130. See Ricardo Bilton, SpaceX’s Worth Skyrockets to $4.8B after Successful 
Mission,VENTUREBEAT.COM (June 7, 2012), 
http://venturebeat.com/2012/06/07/privco-spacexs-worth-skyrockets-to-4-8-
billion-after-successful-mission/. 
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transmit information and make scientific innovations, and could 
essentially trap humanity on Earth.131 
The solution to excess debris is regulation of entrants into 
the extraterrestrial environment.  Congress could amend the 
Commercial Space Launch Act with a specific requirement that 
private sector space activities must consider and mitigate their 
contribution to orbital debris beyond the ionosphere.  
Alternatively and somewhat more feasibly, interested persons 
should petition the Council on Environmental Quality, the 
Department of Transportation, or AST, to issue a regulation 
conditioning the grant of a license on the incorporation of an 
orbital debris mitigation program for releases beyond the 
ionosphere. 
An alternative approach, which offers only procedural 
protection, would be a petition to the Council on Environmental 
Quality, the Department of Transportation, or AST, to recognize 
that the space beyond the ionosphere affects the “human 
environment” and should therefore be considered in an 
environmental impact analysis.  Though procedural protection 
from NEPA would not require any actual regulation of debris, it 
would at least provide an additional procedural step which allows 
the contemplation of the issue.132 
The current regulation of private sector space activities is in 
need of updating to cope with the realities of space economics and 
the very real dangers of unregulated and expanding usage of 
space by private companies.  Short of notice and comment origin 
to such regulations, petitioning for issuance of a rule is the most 
apt alternative for producing the desired effect.  Through 
implementation of private space activities controls, the United 
States can provide an effective international model in furtherance 
of the goal of the mitigation of space debris. 
 
 
 131. KESSLER ET AL., supra note 2. 
 132. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 
435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978); see also Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. 
Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980). 
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